"An-arrgh-chy: The Law and Economics of Pirate Organization" – This paper investigates the internal governance institutions of violent criminal enterprise by examining the law, economics, and organization of pirates. To effectively organize their banditry, pirates required mechanisms to prevent internal predation, minimize crew conflict, and maximize piratical profit. I argue that pirates devised two institutions for this purpose. First, I analyze the system of piratical checks and balances that crews used to constrain captain predation. Second, I examine how pirates used democratic constitutions to minimize conflict and create piratical law and order. Remarkably, pirates adopted both of these institutions before the United States or England. Pirate governance created sufficient order and cooperation to make pirates one of the most sophisticated and successful criminal organizations in history. [Via the Social Science Research Network (SSRN)]

"Pirational Choice: The Economics of Infamous Pirate Practices" – This paper uses rational choice theory to analyze the behavior of pirates. It pierces the myth and mystique of pirate behavior and in doing so provides an economics of piratical practice. I consider three infamous pirate practices: the notorious pirate flag, the "Jolly Roger," piratical torture, and pirate conscription. I argue that these seemingly eccentric pirate practices were in fact rationally-chosen responses to the unique circumstances pirates confronted in their pursuit of profit. Further, each practice effectively promoted pirates' goal. My analysis identifies what might be called 'pirational choice.' The distinction between rational and pirational choice lies not in the irrationality of pirates, as traditional pop-culture depictions of pirates suggest, but rather in the unusual circumstances of pirate decision making. These circumstances are responsible for both the extraordinary features that make pirates perfect fodder for entertainment and the distinctive practices that pirates employed. [Via SSRN]